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CASES NOTED
HEARING REQUIRED BEFORE THE REPOSSESSION
OF GOODS
Appellants, residents of Florida and Pennsylvania, had purchased
household goods in their respective states under conditional sales con-
tracts. The goods were replevied under the Florida and Pennsylvania
prejudgment replevin statutes,' and the appellants brought suit chal-
lenging these statutes as being in contravention of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Both statutes provided for the seizure
of goods by a sheriff upon the filing of an application to a court clerk or
prothonotary and the posting of a bond for double the value of the
property. Neither statute required that notice be given to the possessor
nor that there be an opportunity for a hearing prior to the seizure of
the property. Two three-judge federal district courts upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes which authorized
prejudgment replevin.2 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed in a four-three decision, and held: The Florida and Pennsyl-
vania prejudgment replevin statutes are in violation of the fourteenth
amendment since they deprive the possessor of due process of law by
taking his property without notice and without any prior opportunity
to be heard; and a provision in a sales contract for repossession of goods
upon default is not a waiver of the purchaser's procedural due process
right to a preseizure hearing nor an indication of the method by which
the property will be taken. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
The prejudgment replevin statutes are descendants of the common
law action for replevin, but the early action was used to recover goods
that were either wrongfully taken or distrained. Under the early form,
the one whose goods were being seized had the opportunity to claim that
he was the rightful owner of the goods and the sheriff would then de-
cide whom to believe and would act accordingly.' The procedure under
the laws of Florida and Pennsylvania provided for the issuing of a writ
for goods allegedly wrongfully detained and for subsequent seizure with-
out hearing and before final judgment.
The Florida statute permitted the repossessor to begin his action
merely by filing a bond with the clerk of the court for double the value
of the property. The clerk then executed a writ commanding the sheriff
to replevy the goods in the possession of the defendant and to sum-
mon the defendant to answer the complaint. The sheriff would hold the
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 78 (1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1821 (1967).
2. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ; Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp.
954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
3. 92 S. Ct. at 1993.
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property for three days and then deliver it to the plaintiff unless the de-
fendant gave a forthcoming bond with a surety for double the value
of the property replevied. The bond would be held until the action was
completed. In the event that the defendant posted such a bond, he could
retake the property pending the outcome of the action.4
Under the Pennsylvania law, the applicant was not required to
institute a repossession action nor make an allegation that he was legally
entitled to the property, as was the procedure in Florida. He only needed
to file an affidavit for the property value and post a bond for double
that value. The party from whom the property was replevied had to
either begin an action of his own to recover the property or post a
counterbond within three days of the seizure in order to retake the
property.5
In several recent decisions, the Supreme Court has held that the
due process clause protects certain property interests or rights, and af-
fords the parties whose interests are affected a right to notice and an
opportunity to be heard." Whether the right to be heard was provided
at a "meaningful time" was a basic question considered by the Court
in determining the validity of the statutes in the instant case. Accord-
ing to the Court, if a hearing was necessary, it must have been offered
before the deprivation of the interest and at a time when any contra-
vention of due process requirements could have been prevented.7 Despite
the provision for a hearing after the seizure, neither the Florida nor the
Pennsylvania laws provided for any hearing prior to the seizure of
the property.' In light of this summary procedure, Justice Stewart, in
the majority opinion, held that "no later hearing and no damage award
can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the
right of procedural due process has already occurred."9 The Court con-
cluded that only a hearing held before the deprivation of property had
occurred could meet due process requirements. 10
Prior to Fuentes, there had been considerable dispute as to what
property interests were to be subject to the due process right to a prior
4. FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01, .07, .08, .10-.13 (1969).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1821 (1967) (authorizing writs of replevin) ; PA. R. Civ. P.
1073, 1076, 1077, 1037(a) (procedural prerequisites to issuance of prejudgment writ).
6. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) ; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969).
7. 92 S. Ct. at 1994.
8. The Florida law guaranteed an eventual hearing in each case since the applicant was
required to file a complaint initiating court action in order to obtain a writ of replevin. The
hearing came in the form of a court action for repossession in which the person who had
his property repossessed was the defendant. FLA. STAT. § 78.07 (1969). The Pennsylvania law
did not guarantee that there would ever be a hearing since the writ applicant was not
required to initiate a court action as under the Florida law. In order to insure a hearing,
even though it was after the seizure, the party who had lost his property must have initiated
a lawsuit himself. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1824 (1967).
9. 92 S. Ct. at 1995.
10. Id.
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hearing. The appellants relied heavily on Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.," in which a Wisconsin garnishment statute was invalidated by
the Court as being violative of fundamental principles of due process,
because it failed to provide notice or a prior hearing. In Sniadach,
wages were frozen at the initiation of an action, and throughout the
interim until trial, without any opportunity for the wage earner to be
heard or to tender any defenses he might have. Justice Douglas, in the
majority opinion, stated that "[a] procedural rule that may satisfy
due process for attachments in general . . . does not necessarily satisfy
procedural due process in every case.'
l2
The Sniadach holding could have summarily dealt with all future
situations in which property of any type was taken without notice or
prior hearing. However, Justice Douglas emphasized the gravity of the
problem involved in a garnishment procedure and stated that wages
are a "specialized type of property presenting a distinct problem in our
economic system."' 8 Federal and state courts had been divided in their
interpretation of Sniadach. Some courts restricted its impact to wages,
while other courts made no such distinction and extended the holding
to property deprivation in general.' 4 The district courts in the instant
case held that the household goods seized from the appellants were
not protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
because the items were not "absolute necessities of life."' 5
Fuentes appears to have settled the dispute as to what property
interests are protected by the due process requirement of a prior hear-
ing. The Court rejected what it called a "very narrow" reading of
Sniadach and Goldberg by the district courts. 6 It was held that those
cases were in the "mainstream" of decisions which required notice and
a hearing prior to the deprivation of one's property in order to meet
due process requirements, and they had "little or nothing to do with
the absolute 'necessities' of life . . . 2"' In substantiating its interpre-
tation of Sniadach and Goldberg, the Court pointed to its recent deci-
sion in Bell v. Burson,'" which called for a proper hearing before the
suspension of a driver's license. The holding in that case was that a
driver's license was an "important interest" entitled to the protection
of due process of law. The Court in Fuentes applied the "important
interest" test instead of the far more restrictive test of absolute neces-
11. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sniadach].
12. Id. at 340.
13. Id.
14. 92 S. Ct. at 1990 n.5 (history of cases interpreting Sniadach). In Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg], the Court upheld the right to a prior
opportunity to be heard; however, the case involved welfare benefits, an interest so closely
related to wages the scope of the Sniadach decision was not expanded.
15. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F.
Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
16. 92 S. Ct. at 1998.
17. Id.
18. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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sity.10 Although the Court referred to the "important interest" requisite
as used in Bell v. Burson, it appears that a prior hearing must now be
given before deprivation of any property interest that is more than de
minimis.
20
Historically, exceptions to due process requirements have allowed
summary seizure or deprivation of property where a valid state or fed-
eral interest is present." Justice Harlan recently made it clear that a
hearing must be provided an individual prior to any deprivation of
property except for extraordinary situations where some valid govern-
mental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until
after the event.22 Unable to find any valid state interest involved in
the instant case, the Court held that the procedures authorized by the
Florida and Pennsylvania laws were invalid. Private parties were able
to serve their own private interests under the statutes by unilaterally
invoking state power to replevy goods from another without supervision
by state officials. The lack of state participation in the determination of
the validity of the claim was sufficient grounds to strike down the pre-
judgment replevin statutes, because it constituted an abdication of "ef-
fective state control over state power.
' 23
Having already determined that the appellants had a right to a
hearing prior to the seizure of their property, the Court examined the
conditional sales contract provisions, which provided for the reposses-
sion of the property by the seller in the event of a default in payments.
The Court held that these provisions did not constitute a waiver of
appellants' constitutional right to a prior hearing because the contracts
did not specify the process for repossession but only stated the right of
the seller to retake the goods upon the happening of certain events.
24
The Court distinguished the case of D. H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co.,25
which involved the question of contractual waiver of due process rights.
In Overmeyer, the Court found that there was no unequal bargaining
power and that the parties were aware of the significance of the waiver
provision. The Court in Fuentes held that the present situation in-
19. 92 S. Ct. at 1998.
20. Id. at 1999 n.21.
21. E.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (dis-
missal of government defense employee); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselbery, Inc., 339 U.S.
594 (1950) (protecting public from misbranded goods); Fahey v. Malonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947) (protecting public from bank failure by taking possession); Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503 (1944), and Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding adminis-
trative price and rent controls prior to hearing in time of war); Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589 (1931) (summary seizure of property to collect tax revenue); Coffin Bros. &
Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (attachment of property without hearing following bank
failure); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (attachment of property without hearing
to secure jurisdiction in a state court); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908) (protecting public health from contaminated food).
22. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
23. 92 S. Ct. at 2001.
24. Id. at 2002.
25. 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972).
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volved parties with unequal bargaining power, contracts with terms in
small print without explanation, and a situation where the appellants
were unfamiliar with the ramifications of the provisions involved. Cit-
ing Overmeyer, the Court held that "where the contract is one of adhe-
sion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the
debtor receives nothing for the [waiver] provision, other legal conse-
quences may ensue." 26 The provisions in the instant case were not clear
waivers of the appellants' constitutional rights, and the appellants were
entitled to a preseizure hearing.
At first impression, the ultimate effect of this decision is that it
will force the State to provide notice and proper hearing prior to seizure
of any property interest that is more than de minimis. The limitation
that various courts have imposed on the Sniadach and Goldberg deci-
sions has apparently been swept away, and the due process requirement
of prior hearing is no longer restricted to property of absolute necessity.
The power to seize before final judgment has been entered is still
a valid procedure as long as there has been a real test to determine
the probable validity of a claim for repossession. The Court has also
left room for seizure without prior hearing in cases of important gov-
ernmental or public interest, in which immediate action is necessary to
preserve the interest involved; however, this exception to the due process
requirements does not appear to be a method by which these rights will
be circumvented on a large scale.
Nevertheless, it is still questionable as to what real impact Fuentes
will have in view of Justice White's dissenting opinion. He claims that
creditors can simply make clear in their credit agreements that the
installment buyer waives all right to prior hearing in the event there
is a default. If this is the case, despite the majority holding in this case,
there will be no improvement in the buyer's bargaining position, since
creditors will be allowed an avenue of escape from prior hearing re-
quirements. Moreover, it is unclear whether Fuentes bars a secured
party's right to take possession of his collateral upon default by self-
help, as provided by the Uniform Commercial Code.2 7 The issue to
be decided, where a state statute allows such self-help, is whether there
is "state action" even though the only act done by the state is the en-
actment of the statute itself.
The instant case was a four-three decision with Justices Powell
and Rehnquist not participating. It is yet to be seen whether one of
them will unite with the majority in upholding a right to prior hearing
despite waivers to the contrary and possible statutory provisions for
self-help. If the decision withstands these challenges, it can be a mean-
ingful tool in testing all claims for writs of replevin, giving the buyer
26. 92 S. Ct. at 2002, citing D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 92 S. Ct. 775, 783
(1972).
27. UmoR COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503. See 92 S. Ct. at 2006 (dissenting opinion).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
an equal chance to defend his property interest. The deterrent effect
on those creditors who in the past initiated unjust claims may also be
of substantial value to the buyer's interest.
PETER CHATILOVICZ
GIDEON'S ENCORE
Petitioner, an indigent, was tried without benefit of represen-
tation by counsel on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. The
offense was punishable by imprisonment for up to six months and/or
a one thousand dollar fine. The petitioner was sentenced to serve
ninety days. He thereafter filed an original writ of habeas corpus in
the Supreme Court of Florida alleging that, as an indigent, he was
deprived of his right to counsel and that he was therefore unable to
properly raise and present to the trial court good and sufficient de-
fenses to the charges for which he was convicted. The Florida court
discharged the writ, holding that indigent defendants were entitled
to counsel only when the offense involved a possible imprisonment of
more than six months.1 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held, reversed: Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may
be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor, or felony, unless represented by counsel at trial. Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972).
The right to counsel has slowly but steadily evolved for forty
years2 and was extended to state felony defendants in the landmark
case of Gideon v. Wainwright.' The sweeping language of Gideon' met
mixed reactions in the state courts and legislatures. In a large minority
of them the case was limited on its facts to felonies.' However,
thirty-one states extended the Gideon rule to crimes less serious than
1. State ex ret. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1970).
2. See, e.g., Comment, Will the Trumpet of Gideon Be Heard in All the Halls of Jus-
tice?, 25 U. MiAmi L. REV. 450, 451-52 (1971); Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded
Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L. Rlv. 1249, 1250 (1970).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Gideon]. An interesting account of the
preparation of a series of right to counsel cases including Gideon is found in A. LEWIS,
GIDEON'S TRuMPET (1964); and J. MEADOR, PRELUDES TO GIDEON (1967).
4. The Court stated:
[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him .... The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental . . . in some countries, but it is
in ours.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). The applicable language of the sixth amend-
ment is equally broad, providing that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. E.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. Warden, 193 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1967); Watkins v. Morris,
179 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1965); Fish v. State, 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
